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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Hector Herman Paez appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to felony DUI, with a persistent violator enhancement. On 
appeal, Paez argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On March 26, 2012, Boise City Police Sergeant Kyle Christensen was 
working patrol at the Treefort Music Festival in downtown Boise. (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-
17, p.41, Ls.8-10.) At approximately 10:00 p.m., he was approached by two 
individuals - Lynn McConkie, a private security officer with whom Sergeant 
Christensen had worked several events, and another gentleman whom the 
officer did not know (hereinafter "the citizen informant"). (Tr., p.11, L.21 - p.12, 
L.12, p.19, Ls.9-11, p.22, Ls.1-2, p.41, Ls.113-15.) The citizen informant told the 
officer he had observed a Hispanic male who he believed was "very intoxicated" 
get into a beige Ford Taurus that was parked in front of a nearby bicycle shop 
and was afraid the individual was going to attempt to drive away. (Tr., p.12, L.16 
- p.13, L.14, p.41, Ls.16-20.) Mr. McConkie said the individual described by the 
citizen informant sounded like the same individual who had just been ejected 
from the music festival because he was "too intoxicated" and "was causing some 
problems in the area." (Tr., p.13, Ls.4-17, p.41, Ls.20-23.) 
Based on this information, Sergeant Christensen and another officer 
walked toward intersection where the bicycle shop was located. (Tr., p.13, L.18 
- p.14, L.1, p.41, L.24 - p.42, L.1.) When they got to the intersection they 
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observed a beige Ford Taurus in a parking space along the street. (Tr., p.14, 
Ls.2-7, p.15, Ls.13-19.) The brake lights were on, the motor was running, and 
there was a Hispanic man - later identified as Paez - sitting in the driver's seat. 
(Tr., p.14, Ls.7-10, p.17, Ls.12-21, p.42, Ls.1-3.) It appeared to the officers that 
Paez was trying to get the vehicle out of the parking space. (Tr., p.14, Ls.13-15.) 
The officers approached the vehicle and Sergeant Christensen tapped on 
the window. (Tr., p.15, Ls.22 - p.16, L.4.) Paez, who the officer described as 
having "kind of a sleepy look to him," did not immediately respond. (Tr., p.16, 
Ls.10-12, p.20, Ls.14-15, p.42, Ls.4-6.) He had his foot on the brake and was 
struggling to get the vehicle into gear. (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-9, p.15-18, p.42, Ls.6-9.) 
Sergeant Christensen directed Paez to roll down the window and, when Paez did 
so, the officer reached in and turned off the car to prevent Paez from attempting 
to drive away while the officer was talking to him. (Tr., p.16, Ls.13-17.) 
Sergeant Christensen ultimately opened the car door and, upon doing so, 
detected "a very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle." 
(Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.1.) Paez's "speech was slurred, and he appeared to 
[the officer] to be very intoxicated." (Tr., p.17, Ls.1-4.) He refused to perform 
field sobriety tests but later testing showed he had a blood alcohol concentration 
of .324. (PSI, p.3.) 
The state charged Paez with felony DUI, with a persistent violator 
enhancement, and misdemeanor DWP. (R., pp.27-29, 39-41.) Paez moved to 
suppress the evidence against him, contending officers lacked reasonable 
suspicion to detain him. (R., pp.46-53.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the 
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district court denied the motion. (R., p.63; Tr., p.41, L.2 - p.42, L.25.) Paez 
thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to felony DUI, with a persistent 
violator enhancement, and specifically reserved the right on appeal to challenge 
the denial of his suppression motion. (R., pp.66-73; Tr., p.45, L.14 - p.60, L.12.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with three years fixed. 
(R., pp.74-78.) Paez timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.82-85.) 
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ISSUE 
Paez states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress 
because the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. 
Paez[.] 
(Appellant's brief, p.6 (capitalization altered).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Paez failed to establish error in the denial of his suppression motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Paez Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Paez challenges the denial of his suppression motion, arguing as he did 
below that the information supplied by the citizen informant was not sufficiently 
reliable to provide officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct 
an investigative detention. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-15.) Paez's argument fails. 
The district court correctly determined Paez was not entitled to suppression 
because the information provided by the citizen informant, together with all of the 
the other information known to the officers, was more than sufficient, under the 
totality of the circumstances, to supply the officers with reasonable suspicion that 
Paez was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 
203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 
19 (2007). 
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C. The Information Supplied By The Citizen Informant, Together With All Of 
The Other Information Known To The Officers, Provided Them With The 
Reasonable Suspicion Necessary To Justify The Investigative Stop 
It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains 
a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a 
crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 
811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983)). "Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and 
the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Bishop, 146 Idaho 
804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 
983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ). While the 
"quantity and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion 
is less than that necessary to establish probable cause .... reasonable suspicion 
requires more than a mere hunch or 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion."' 
Bishop. 146 Idaho at 811,203 P.3d at 1210 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 
325, 329-30 (1990)). The reasonableness of the police officer's suspicion is 
evaluated based upon "the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
before the time of the stop." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 (citing 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417-18 ( 1981)). 
The reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative detention 
may be supplied by an informant's tip or a citizen's report of suspected criminal 
activity. White, 496 U.S. at 329; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; 
6 
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 685, 263 P.3d 145, 150 (Ct. App. 2011); 
State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000). "Whether 
a tip amounts to reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the 
circumstances including the substance, source, and reliability of the information 
provided." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203 P.3d at 1210 (citing White, 496 U.S. at 
328-29). "An anonymous tip, standing alone, is generally not enough to justify a 
stop because an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's 
basis of knowledge or veracity." Linenberger, 151 Idaho at 685, 263 P.3d at 150 
(citing White, 496 U.S. at 329; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000)); see 
also Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211 (anonymous tip that provides 
only description of subject and alleges commission of crime "generally will not 
give rise to reasonable suspicion"). "However, when the information from an 
anonymous tip bears sufficient indicia of reliability or is corroborated by 
independent police observations, it may provide justification for a stop." 
Linenberger, 151 Idaho at 685, 263 P.3d at 150 (citing White, 496 U.S. at 331-
32). "Where the information comes from a known citizen informant ... , the 
citizen's disclosure of his or her identity, which carries the risk of accountability if 
the allegations turn out to be fabricated, is generally deemed adequate to show 
veracity and reliability." lg_,_ (citations omitted); accord Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 
203 P.3d at 1211 (tip from known citizen informant is "generally sufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion"). Ultimately, "[t]he more reliable the tip, the less 
information required to establish reasonable suspicion." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 
812,203 P.3d at 1211. 
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Contrary to Paez's assertions on appeal, application of the foregoing legal 
principles to the facts of this case supports the district court's conclusion that 
Paez's detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. When officers sought 
out Paez's vehicle, they did so based on a report from a citizen informant that a 
Hispanic male who appeared to be very intoxicated had gotten into a beige Ford 
Taurus that was parked in front of a bicycle shop at the corner of 13th and Main 
streets in Boise. (Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.13, L.4.) At the time of the report, there was 
a music festival going on very near the location of the bicycle shop. (Tr., p.11, 
Ls.11-13, p.23, L.18 - p.24, L.7, p.26, L.2 - p.28, L.3.) Lynn McConkie, who 
was working security detail at the festival and who had assisted the citizen 
informant in flagging down the officers, advised the officers that a Hispanic male 
had very recently been ejected from the beer garden at the festival for being "too 
intoxicated" and "causing some problems in the area." (Tr., p.11, L.21 - p.13, 
L.17.) 
When officers subsequently approached the intersection of 13th and Main 
streets, they saw a beige Ford Taurus, like that described by the citizen 
informant, in a parking space along the street. (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-7, p.15, Ls.13-16.) 
Also consistent with the citizen informant's report, a Hispanic male was in the 
driver's seat. (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-10.) Before he even approached the vehicle, 
Sergeant Christensen could see that the driver was "trying" (apparently 
unsuccessfully) "to get the vehicle out of the parking space." (Tr., p.14, Ls.8-15.) 
Upon closer inspection, the officer observed through the closed driver's side 
window that the driver "had kind of a sleepy look to him" and "appeared to be 
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struggling greatly with a very simple task, which is putting a car [with an 
automatic transmission] from park into reverse or drive." (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-9, p.20, 
Ls.14-18.) The driver was also slow in responding when the officer tapped on 
the window. (Tr., p.16, Ls.10-12.) 
Viewed in their totality, the above facts support the district court's 
conclusion that the officers "had more than a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, specifically that [Paez] was operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol." (Tr., p.42, Ls.10-14.) The citizen informant's report, 
corroborated in part by the statements of Lynn McConkie and in part by the 
officers' own observations of Paez's appearance and behavior, provided 
sufficiently reliable information upon which the officers could rationally conclude 
that Paez - who was behind the wheel of a motor vehicle with its engine running 
- was intoxicated. See, sLll., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 
(citations omitted) ("Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable 
facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts."); 
Linenberger, 151 Idaho at 685, 263 P.3d at 150 (citizen's report that man 
matching Linenberger's description may be involved in illegal drug activity on 
boat, corroborated by officer's independent observation of odor associated with 
methamphetamine emanating from inside cabin of boat when Linenberger 
opened the door, "provided sufficiently reliable information that established a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity"). 
Relying exclusively on what he deems to be the factual differences 
between this case and Bishop, supra, Paez argues the information provided by 
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the citizen informant was neither reliable on its face nor sufficiently corroborated 
to establish reasonable suspicion. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-15.) Specifically, he 
contends that, unlike the report of criminal activity in Bishop, the tip in this case 
was "truly anonymous" because officers did not know the citizen informant's 
name and were unable to find him again after they detained Paez. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.13-14.) Paez's argument fails under the reasoning of the very case he 
cites. 
In Bishop, two unnamed carnival workers reported to a city official that a 
man matching Bishop's description had attempted to sell them 
methamphetamine. 146 Idaho at 808-09, 203 P.3d at 1207-08. The city official, 
in turn, relayed that information to police who thereafter detained Bishop based 
on the description that had been provided. kl An officer subsequently tracked 
down the carnival workers and they identified Bishop as the man who had tried 
to sell them methamphetamine. kl at 809, 203 P.3d at 1208. In rejecting 
Bishop's claim that the report of criminal activity should be regarded as 
anonymous, the Idaho Supreme Court focused, in part, on the fact that the 
carnival workers' identities were readily ascertainable, as evidenced by the fact 
that the officer was able to find them and have them identify Bishop after he was 
arrested. kl at 813, 203 P.3d at 1212. Also important to the Court's analysis, 
however, was the fact that there was no evidence the workers had been trying to 
conceal their identities when they reported the crime to the city official. kl 
While the citizen informant in this case did not provide the officers with his 
name or any other information by which they could trace his identity, the state 
10 
submits that such did not render him a "truly anonymous" tipster as suggested by 
Paez. But see Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211 (citations omitted) 
(indicating that, where police do not know informant's name, "any information 
that makes the informant's identity readily ascertainable will suffice"). The citizen 
informant did not merely call an anonymous tip line or rely on anyone else to 
convey his observations to law enforcement for him. And, as in Bishop, there is 
no evidence that the citizen informant was otherwise attempting to conceal his 
identity. To the contrary, the citizen informant personally sought out the officers 
and reported to them his first-hand observations of what he believed to be 
potentially illegal activity. 
Even treating the citizen informant as an anonymous tipster, Bishop does 
not compel the finding, urged by Paez, that the information he supplied was 
unreliable. Unlike this case, Bishop involved a report of criminal activity that had 
occurred in the past (the attempted distribution of methamphetamine) and that 
the officer could not independently corroborate through his own observations. 
Here, the citizen informant reported a suspected crime in progress, and the 
details of his report were not only subject to immediate confirmation and 
corroboration by police, they were actually immediately corroborated both by the 
statements of Lynn McConkie and by the officers' independent observations. 
Clearly, these facts weigh in favor of a finding of reliability. See Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211 (citing among factors indicative of reliability 
"whether the information was based on first-hand observations of the events as 
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they were occurring" and whether the information "was subject to immediate 
confirmation or corroboration by police"). 
Paez attempts on appeal to minimize the corroborative value of both Mr. 
McConkie's statements and the officers' observations. Specifically, he argues 
that while Mr. McConkie stated the description provided by the citizen informant 
matched that of a man who had just been ejected from the beer garden, the 
description given - an intoxicated Hispanic male - was "too general to have 
provided any meaningful corroboration," particularly since the evidence showed 
there were "several hundred, if not a few thousand, people in the area for the 
event." (Appellant's brief, p.14 (transcript citation omitted).) He likewise 
contends that Sergeant Christensen's observations upon approaching the car -
that the driver "looked sleepy and appeared to be having trouble putting the car 
in gear" - "were just too general to corroborate" the information supplied by the 
citizen informant. (Id., p.15.) Paez's arguments are unavailing because they 
ignore the relevant legal standards and address each piece of corroborative 
information in isolation rather than together as required by the applicable totality 
of the circumstances test. 
The information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion need not 
demonstrate with certainty, or even probability, that a particular person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime. Nor does each individual piece of 
information known to an officer need to independently furnish reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. Rather, as explained by the United States 
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Supreme Court in Alabama v. White, supra, an assessment of reasonable 
suspicion depends on all of the circumstances facing an officer: 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than 
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can 
be established with information that is different in quantity or 
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in 
the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that 
is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon 
both the content of information possessed by police and its degree 
of reliability. Both factors - quantity and quality - are considered in 
the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture, that must be 
taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable 
suspicion. 
White, 496 U.S. at 330-31 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In this case, there can be no question that Mr. McConkie's statement that 
a Hispanic male had just been ejected from the beer garden contributed to the 
reliability of the citizen informant's report that, at approximately the same time 
and very near the same area, a "very intoxicated" Hispanic male got into a 
vehicle. While Mr. McConkie's statements may have been too general by 
themselves to establish reasonable suspicion, they were certainly part of the 
"whole picture" facing the officer at the time of the detention. 
Also contributing to the "whole picture" were the officers' own 
observations. Contrary to Paez's assertions on appeal, the officers did not just 
observe a driver "who looked sleepy and appeared to be having trouble putting 
the car in gear." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) Rather, the officers observed a beige 
Ford Taurus (like that described by the citizen informant) at the intersection of 
13th and Main Streets (the precise location described by the citizen informant) 
being operated by a Hispanic male (a description that matched that given by 
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both the citizen informant and Mr. McConkie) who had a "sleepy look to him" and 
was trying to get the car out of a parking space but was "struggling greatly with 
[the] very simple task" of shifting gears in a car with an automatic transmission 
(signs the officer independently associated with intoxication). (Tr., p.12, L.16 -
p.16, L.12, p.18, L.20-p.20, L.20.) 
Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the citizen 
informant's report, corroborated by Mr. McConkie's statements and the officers' 
own observations, provided sufficiently reliable information that established a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Paez has failed to show error in the 
denial of his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the 
district court's order denying Paez's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 1ih day of September 2013. 
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